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Bhupinder Singh Anand1 
We reproduce Hilbert’s axiomatic formalization of Number Theory, and argue 
that his enunciation of the Law of the Excluded Middle is inconsistent with a 
Turing-verifiable model of the axioms under the standard interpretation. 
1. Introduction 
In Section 2, p1-9, we reproduce Hilbert’s axiomatic formalization of Number Theory. In 
Section 3, p6-7, we vindicate Brouwer’s objection, to Hilbert’s enunciation of the Law of 
the Excluded Middle as a logical principle even for quantified expressions, by showing 
that this enunciation is inconsistent with a Turing-verifiable model of Hilbert’s axioms 
under the standard interpretation. In Sections 4 and 5, p8-9, we highlight the continuing, 
and seemingly removable, ambiguity in current interpretations of classical theory. 
2. Hilbert's formalisation of Number Theory 
The following outline of Hilbert's axiomatic formalisation of Number Theory is 
excerpted from [Hi27]. 
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I shall now present the fundamental idea of my proof theory. 
All the propositions that constitute mathematics are converted into formulas, so 
that mathematics proper becomes an inventory of formulas. These differ from the 
ordinary formulas of mathematics only in that, besides the ordinary signs, the 
logical signs: 
   →              &          v          ~          (∀x)           (∃x)   
implies        and        or        not        for all        there exists  
also occur in them. Certain formulas, which serve as building blocks for the 
formal edifice of mathematics, are called axioms. A proof is an array that must be 
given as such to our perceptual intuition of it of inferences according to the 
schema: 
 
    Š   
Š → Ý   
   Ý  
where each of the premises, that is, the formulae, Š and Š → Ý in the array either 
is an axiom or follows directly from an axiom by substitution, or else coincides 
with the end formula of an inference occurring earlier in the proof or results from 
it by substitution. A formula is said to be provable if it is either an axiom or the 
end formula of a proof. 
The axioms and provable propositions, that is, the formulas resulting from this 
procedure, are copies of the thoughts constituting customary mathematics as it has 
developed till now. 
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Through the program outlined here the choice of axioms for our proof theory is 
already indicated; we arrange them as follows. 
I. Axioms of implication 
1. A → (B → A) (introduction of an assumption) 
2. (A → (A → B)) → (A → B) (omission of an assumption) 
3. (A → (B → C)) → (B → (A → C)) (interchange of assumptions) 
4. (B → C) → ((A → B) → (A → C)) (elimination of a proposition) 
II. Axioms about & and v 
5. A & B → A 
6. A & B → B 
7. A → (B → A & B) 
8. A → A v B 
9. B → A v B 
10. ((A → C) & (B → C)) → ((A v B) → C)) 
III. Axioms of negation 
11. (A → B & ~B) → ~A  (principle of contradiction); 
12. ~(~A)) → A (principle of double negation) 
The axioms of groups I, II, and III are nothing but the axioms of the propositional 
calculus. From 11 and 12 there follows, in particular, the formula: 
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(A & ~(A)) → B  
and, further, the logical principle of excluded middle: 
((A → B) & (~A → B)) → B 
IV. The logical ε-axiom 
13. A(a) → A(ε(A)) 
Here ε(A) stands for an object of which the proposition A(a) certainly holds if it 
holds of any object at all; let us call ε the logical ε-function. To elucidate the role 
of the logical ε-function let us make the following remarks. 
In the formal system the ε-function is used in three ways. 
1. By means of ε, “all” and “there exists” can be defined, namely, as follows: 
(∀a) A(a) ↔ A(ε(~A)) 
(∃a) A(a) ↔ A(ε(A)) 
Here the double arrow (↔) stands for a combination of two implication 
formulas; in its place we shall henceforth use the "equivalence" sign (≡). 
On the basis of this definition the ε-axiom IV(13) yields the logical relations 
that hold for the universal and the existential quantifier, such as: 
(∀a) A(a) → A(b) (Aristotle's dictum), 
and: 
~((∀a) A(a)) → (∃a)(~A(a)) (principle of excluded middle). 
 5 
2. If a proposition Y holds of one and only one object, then ε(Y) is the object 
of which Y(a) holds. 
The ε-function thus enables us to resolve a proposition such as Y(a), when it 
holds of only one object, so as to obtain: 
a = ε(Y)  
3. Beyond this, ε takes on the role of the choice function; that is, in case A(a) 
holds of several objects, ε(Y) is some one of the objects a of which Y(a) 
holds. 
In addition to these purely logical axioms we have the following specifically 
mathematical axioms. 
V. Axioms of equality 
14. a = a 
15. (a = b) → (A(a) → A(b)) 
VI. Axioms of Number 
16. a' ≠ 0;  (≠ for “not =”) 
 
17. (A(0) & (∀a) (A(a) → A(a'))) → A(b)  
 
(principle of mathematical induction). 
Here a' denotes the number following and the integers 1, 2, 3, . . . can be written 
in the form 0', 0'', 0''', ... 
 6 
3. Why Brouwer was right 
Now, instead of using Hilbert’s ε-function to define the standard interpretations of the 
universal and existential quantifiers, ‘(∀x)’ and ‘(∃x)’, we consider the case where, 
under the standard interpretation: 
(i) ‘(∀x)’ is interpreted directly as ‘(There is an algorithm T such that, for any given 
x, T verifies …)’; 
(ii) ‘(∃x)’ is defined as ‘~(∀x)~’, and interprets as ‘(There is no algorithm T such 
that, for any given x, T falsifies …)’ 
Under the above interpretation, all of Hilbert's axioms for Number Theory, including the 
induction axiom (the only one involving a quantifier) can be seen to interpret as not only 
intuitively true, but also intuitively Turing-verifiable, under the standard interpretation. 
The system, thus, has an intuitively verifiable model under the standard interpretation, 
and, so, is intuitively consistent constructively. 
However, although the ε-axiom IV(13) yields a logical relation that holds intuitively for 
the universal quantifier, namely: 
(∀a) A(a) → A(b) (Aristotle's dictum) 
the principle of the excluded middle, as enunciated by Hilbert, does not necessarily 
follow. 
Thus, from ~((∀a) A(a)), we may only conclude that there is no algorithm such that, for 
any given a, A(a) holds. 
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As Gödel has shown [Go31a], if the system is ω-inconsistent2, then we cannot exclude 
the possibility of a meta-proof that, first, A(a) is a logical consequence of the axioms of 
such a theory for any given a, and that, second, ~((∀a)A(a)), too, is a logical 
consequence of the axioms. 
So, even if for variously stated reasons, Brouwer was, after all, essentially right in 
objecting to Hilbert's unconditional postulation of the principle of the excluded middle as 
a ‘logical’ consequence, namely, the implication: 
~((∀a) A(a)) → (∃a)(~A(a)).  
It is implicit in the objection that, if we assume only simple consistency for Hilbert's 
system, then we cannot unconditionally define “there exists” intuitively, under the 
standard interpretation, as: 
(∃a) A(a) ↔ A(ε(A)). 
This definition implies that the system is ω-consistent. Such a postulation through 
definition is not only not self-evident, it is also not apparent as being an explicit, or even 
implicit, condition in Hilbert’s formalization of a verifiable Number Theory, at least in 
19273. 
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 To see the significance of this, note that, in a 1930 essay [Hi30], Hilbert proposed an ω-rule as a finitary 
means of extending PA: 
 
Hilbert’s ω-Rule: If it is proved that the formula [A(z)] is a true numerical formula for each given numeral 
[z], then the formula [(∀x)A(x)] may be admitted as an initial formula. 
 
However, the question arises: Is the rule really finitary, and can it lead to an inconsistency? 
 
Now, Gödel has argued meta-mathematically, in his seminal 1931 paper on undecidable propositions 
[Go31a], that we can construct a relation [R(x)], in any recursively enumerable language L of Peano 
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4. Current interpretations of classical theory 
Current interpretations of classical theory, avoiding the explicitly ambiguous - and 
implicitly Platonic - use of Hilbert’s ε-function, define (∃a) more straightforwardly 
by the formal equivalence: 
(∃a) A(a) ↔ ~((∀a) ~A(a)). 
However, following Hilbert, they continue to deny the validity of Brouwer's objection 
by, implicitly, interpreting the above as A(ε(A)), in Hilbert's sense, under the standard 
interpretation4. 
Whether intentional or not, it is such implicit interpretation that tolerates the curious – 
and intuitionistically objectionable - inference of A(ε(A)) from ~((∀a)~A(a)) as a 
valid step in the formalization of Rosser's proof that Gödelian undecidability can be 
deduced in a simply consistent Peano Arithmetic ([Me64], p146, (i)(1)-(i)(4)), even 
though the Arithmetic does not have an axiom corresponding to Hilbert’s ‘(∃a) A(a) 
↔ A(ε(A))’! 
                                                 
Arithmetic, such that R(n) holds for any natural number n under the standard interpretation M of L, but 
[(∀x)R(x)] is unprovable in L.  
 
According to the preceding, constructive, interpretation of universal quantification, this would simply mean 
that there is no algorithm for determining that, given any n in an interpretation M of L, R(n) holds in M. 
 
Clearly, under such an interpretation of universal quantification, L+[(∀x)R(x)] would be inconsistent, 
whilst L+[~(∀x)R(x)] would be consistent (or, as Gödel termed it, consistent but not ω-consistent). 
 
Thus, Hilbert's introduction of an ω-rule tacitly presumes that the language into which it is to be introduced 
is ω-consistent.  
 
However, prima facie, there appear no reasonably intuitive grounds that favour such an implicit 
presumption. 
 
4
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5. Conclusions 
If we admit the above analysis as (possibly, implicitly) underlying Brouwer's 
reluctance to accept the unqualified postulation of the Law of the Excluded Middle as 
a logical consequence, then the choice is between an omega-inconsistent system in 
which the universal quantifier can be interpreted Turing-verifiably, and an omega-
consistent system that is inconsistent with such an interpretation. 
Clearly, if we are to abide faithfully by the principle of Occam's razor, the former 
must be preferred as being more in harmony with, not only Hilbert's stated goal of a 
verifiable proof theory, but also with current requirements and interpretations of 
Computability Theory.  
So, despite the philosophical positions taken in their dispute over it, Brouwer's 
objections to the Law of the Excluded Middle should, thus, be viewed as furthering 
Hilbert's goal, rather than hindering it. 
Moreover, we may need to review standard interpretations of classical theory to make 
them consistent with a Turing-verifiable interpretation of the universal quantifier, 
‘(∀x)’, as ‘(There is an algorithm T such that, for any given x, T verifies …)’. 
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